ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTON'S REMARKS AT SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLENARY SESSION

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Keynote Remarks at the Society for International Development Plenary Session

Remarks

Rick Barton
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations

SID Plenary Session

Washington, DC

June 21, 2013

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTON:  Good afternoon and thank you all for being here. Thanks to John, Daniel, Rodney Bent, and to everyone who put this together. Thanks most of all to all of you here for all of your years of fine work in this field. I had a chance to meet with you when this was a much smaller group, and there were these Saturday workshops, and there seemed to be only about 25 people in the room. Now they have me in front of a blinding spotlight, in front of thousands, so you’ve been doing well. It’s a sign of the great work you’ve been doing.

I thought I would try to spend ten minutes, and sadly, I don’t have a watch because I’ve got poison ivy, but you’ll give me a signal here. I want to bring you up to date on what we’ve been doing to just set the table for a conversation, because I see you’ve had keynote speeches and keynote addresses, and I thought maybe a keynote conversation would be the best we could do in this slot right after your break.

I’ll give you a brief update on this one year that we’ve been in existence, because I think it’s quite telling in a lot of ways, and give you a sense of how we’re gaining traction. I’ll also talk about a couple of the nagging problems that we’re facing that some of you, obviously, are addressing, and then, just quickly summarize what the ambition is going forward. I’ll put them all in a summary fashion so that it sets up the question and answer and the conversation with all of you.

This new bureau, CSO, was created at the State Department a year ago, as part of the QDDR process with a very simple mission, which was to make the U.S. Government more effective and more coherent in addressing conflict and crisis cases in order to break cycles of violence. So it’s a pretty ambitious mission. What we’ve tried to do this year is focus 80 percent of our effort in four major engagements—Kenya and election-related violence, Syria, Burma—the peace process—and Honduras, Northern Central America’s issue with the proliferation of homicide and the loss of state control. I know that many of you work in these spaces, but we’ve also been in ten other countries to try to work across the conflict spectrum in every part of the world with a range of initiatives, always looking for multiple partners and being as opportunistic in that regard as possible, and with a default position that is to build on the best available local opportunities.

I think we’ve gained traction in doing that by really emphasizing a few things. First, we try to go into places that really matter to the U.S. Government as opposed to spreading ourselves all over the world at the same time with something relatively new. So we’ve focused on places that matter, and when we’ve looked at those places, we’ve tried to see if there is a “ripeness of place,” whether going in at this time would actually make any difference. We also make sure that we have rigorous, joint, independent analysis. I’m sure that we all know that if we send in an agronomist, the answer may well be that there’s an agronomy problem. If we send in a refugee person, there are always refugees. If we send in a counterterrorism person, the answer might well be terrorism. The United States should avoid showing up in a place in all of our splendor; it makes more sense to focus on what’s most important, where we can make the greatest progress. That’s what we’ve been trying to bring to the policy and strategy-shaping side of this conversation. Make sure that we have an emphasis on what appears to be the most important issue. Then we want to see the implementation being done by those who are the most capable. That’s not a default position to anybody, no sense of entitlement. We’re not trying to elbow our way into the room, but we look for who is the best placed to do the necessary work. It can be anyone from one of our international partners, to a private firm, to obviously, USAID, who is our most common, most regular partner, but also the Department of Defense or whoever seems to be best placed at the UN.

One brief example I’d like to give you involves Kenya. I think almost everyone realized that if Kenya went back in to a cycle that it had faced five years ago when its last election occurred, when over a thousand people were killed, hundreds of thousands left their homes, and really the political elite that had driven that very negative process were back in the same place that they had been four years before, that Kenya, the country that we all count on as an anchor in the region, and is really an anchor in Africa, would be at risk.

AID’s Democracy and Governance office put together a meeting for us in the Rift Valley, which we had looked at as one of the two hot spots in the country. At that meeting, they had the 15 or so critical partners of the U.S. Government. Since over $600 million of our $800 million portfolio there was really in the health space, we needed to have some of the people who were working on AIDS, as well as agronomy, and the range of issues that AID and the U.S. Government were advancing. When we had that conversation, it was a slightly different one than usual. We didn’t ask people to give us their portfolios to describe their own work. Instead, the conversation started off with: “What do you think is the most important problem in your country this year?” And every single Kenyan in the room, said: “Election-related violence. If Kenya falls into violence, everything that we’re doing will not matter.”

Then we asked, “Are you doing everything that you can to help prevent that?” And they all said no. So we said, “Would you like to do more?” And they replied, “Yes, of course, because this is what’s most important to our country.” Then we got to: “What might you bring to this particular challenge—hot spots, a police capacity that is not able to respond, a very rich civil society that might not be engaged in this problem, a political elite that seems to be manipulating people, and obviously the problem of idle youth and a labor force that was available if needed.” The first person to speak was the agronomist, and he said, “You know, I don’t really have much that I can bring to this problem. I have only 4,000 people involved in my program in this area of the country.” I said to him, as a former politician, that you can get elected governor of any state in the United States except for Texas with 4,000 people.

The next person to speak was from the AIDS program, and he said that he visits just 200,000 households in this area a week, and didn’t know if that would be of any value. We had two people on the ground who were meeting with the Catholic and Episcopal bishops; they were meeting with the elders, systematically going around, and we had a number of wonderful AID programs, and OTI had some great activities out there. But the opportunity that quickly presented itself was that there was this immense wealth of talent, they all knew what the most critical problem was, and all they really needed was to take their asset base—their connections, their communities—and direct them toward the biggest problem in the country without totally interrupting their own work and compromising that.

What they needed was additional Kenyan help to use their resource base to direct it to that problem. So that’s something we were able to contribute, in a very timely fashion. Part of what we do is to look at that 12-to-18 month period—when it’s hard for some of the more normal programs to get going and to really accelerate what we’re doing.

Very quickly, here are a couple of nagging problems that I know some of you are working on—to stimulate the conversation. The first one is near-term public safety. I think all of us find that this is a real challenge in trying to do our work; it’s obviously the consuming interest of any local citizen. Part of what we’ve started to find is that there really are capabilities in the local police, in particular, that we are underestimating, and we have to find ways to take advantage of. In Kenya all of those citizen groups became an early-warning system for the police, but they also created a demand on the police, so that the police knew they were not only getting help from the community, but there was an expectation that they would actually have to do something.
We found the same thing in Honduras, where a new tax has been passed. But the likelihood that the tax would be collected well, appropriated wisely, and spent appropriately was not that great. So that was a chance to take advantage of another local opportunity.

The final thing I’d like to say about nagging problems involves our ability to generate fresh ideas. From the time I had with the UN, this particular administration was being welcomed back into the world community in a way that we may have drifted away from during the first part of this century. But then the expectation was very quickly about what ideas we have to solve these nagging problems. So it’s not enough just to be there and have people thinking favorably of you, but what are you doing?

I think that some of our own behavior continues to get in the way of our being the idea generators that we need to be. In particular, I think that we have a sense of entitlement to certain spaces, with the sense that “I do that work, why are you in this space?” Whether it’s policy discussions, and oftentimes, the State Department has an off-putting way with AID, the Department of Defense, by saying that we’ll handle the policy and the strategy, or whether it’s in implementation, where I’ve had people say to me, “I’m not sure we need you in this country, I think we’ve got this problem solved,” and I’m thinking that this person, with six Greek gods, would still be overwhelmed. But there is this sense of a proprietary interest which is keeping us from solving problems.

So what I’d like to do is offer a new metaphor for how we should think about these things: One of the ways that we’ve looked at these problems in the government is by saying: “Stay in your lane,” and my feeling about staying in your lane these days is that this is a very 20^th century idea. Now, staying in your lane brings to my mind the picture of a swim meet and people swimming up and down in their lanes, but the games that we’re playing look an awful lot more like water polo. It’s the same pool, it takes many of the same skills, but people are pushing you to the bottom of the pool on regular occasions, there is a net at the end, there is a ball…there are significant differences, it’s much more chaotic, much more dynamic, and we’ve got to get out of this “stay in your lane” mentality.

I remember being at the White House for a meeting with Samantha Power, and she started off her comments by saying, “Well, I know this is way outside of my lane.” As it turned out, this was the most valuable contribution that anyone made throughout the meeting. And I remember saying to her after the meeting, “Samantha, please stay out of your lane from here on out.” So I invite all of you to do the same because I think we clearly need that if we’re going to fulfill the potential we have in these places.

Finally, I would say that I think we can make a difference in these conflict places. Obviously, I felt this over the 18 years that I’ve worked in this space and in the conflicts that I’ve been in. But to do that, we’re going to have to get more coherent, we’re going to have to get more effective, we’re going to have to get more inclusive of each other, and I think if we do, this will be a more peaceful world. I look forward to your questions and comments, and this conversation. Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thanks Rick, thank you so much. You can see why Rick is such a beloved and missed figure at CSIS. He’s smart, he understands the politics, he’s also got lots of ideas and I think it’s great he’s in public service, and I admire your public service very much, Rick, so thanks for being with us today. There are a lot of smart people in this room who think about the issues of conflict and development—I’m looking at Arthur Keys, I’m looking at Rodney Bent, I’m looking at Matt McLean, I’m also thinking of…there are a number of groups here who do community policing work, there are some folks here from ICMA, I know Creative Associates does that, but first, Arthur, I’m going to put you on the spot, everyone knows I’m doing this now. Could you bring up the microphone to Arthur Keys, who’s the CEO of IRD. Arthur, you think quite a lot about the issue of conflict and development. If you would, just kick off the conversation.

ARTHUR KEYS: Rick, I’m going to put you on the spot. It seems like a real hot spot in Syria. What creative and positive scenarios do you see there from the U.S. Government and NGO perspective?

MODERATOR: Why don’t I bunch a couple? Matt, you’ve been part of a small business thinking about the intersection between civil-military affairs and government for a long time, as well. Both at AID as a member of the National Security Council, and perhaps other government agencies in another life, but I won’t say which ones. I can’t remember at this point what the other ones were. Can we get a microphone over here to my friend Matt McLean? … Matt? And Rodney, I’m going to ask you to comment, as well.

MATT MCLEAN: Rick, good to see you again. Recalling my NSC days, one of my chief responsibilities at the White House was to integrate different agency activities and keep the policy in line, so in that capacity you’re dealing with a number of different conflict and post-conflict places around the world. Really, there are two parts to the question. One, what are the key instruments that the US government brings to bear? And two, how do you get that coordinated across different agencies and what are some of the challenges there?

MODERATOR: And let me just do one more—we’re doing this World Bank style.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTON: Make sure I heard that, Matt. I’m sorry.

MODERATOR: Matt, could you just repeat that?

MATT MCLEAN: Sure—the question is what are some of the key instruments that the U.S. Government can bring to bear in conflict and post-conflict situations? Particularly, there are some that are going to be tier 1, and some places that are not so tier 1. And secondly, how do you at the State Department help leverage, or encourage, or motivate, or whip up different agencies into their “swim lanes,” if you will, so we’re working toward a common objective?

MODERATOR: Okay, Rodney, Alonzo, I’m going to want you to comment, as well. Please, Rodney.

RODNEY BENT: (laughs) This feels like a collective punishment.

MODERATOR: It is!

RODNEY BENT: Never sit in the front of the classroom.

MODERATOR: I know, exactly. I can see you guys, you’re in my line of fire because of the bright lights.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTON: If he does this just right, I’ll get all the questions, and we’ll run out of time.

MODERATOR: (laughs) Exactly!

RODNEY BENT: That would be the typical Congressional appropriator move. Rick, it’s great to see you again. Congratulations on your job. I want to latch together two parts of your past—your UN work, and piggy-backing a little bit on Matt’s question, it’s not just using UN agencies—I’m sorry—U.S. Government agencies, what do you see as the possibilities, and going back to Arthur’s question about Syria, of working more internationally. What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of either group?

MODERATOR: Okay, Alonzo? Could I ask you also to comment as the former mission director in Afghanistan, among the many other jobs you’ve held?

ALONZO: Rick, once again, I want to echo the comments of Dan, and thank you for your continued government service at an excellent level. One of the questions I have is that we learned a lot of lessons from 2005, or 2004-2010 in regards to intergovernmental relations, trying to do a whole-of-government approach to addressing the problems we’re having in a lot of conflict areas. It seems as though over the past couple of years that that whole approach has gone away. Clearly there were a lot of lessons learned over that process, and I want to get a sense from you of how much of that we’ve taken away if the demand goes up again and we have another Afghanistan situation.

MODERATOR: Those will be the questions, Rick. Those four. I promise.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTON: Okay, thank you. Let me see if I can get through these. How much time do we have?

MODERATOR: Five minutes.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTON: Okay, so concise answers to good, tough questions.
Syria obviously is just a brutal challenge right now, and I want to set up the challenge in a slightly different way. When the revolution started, we didn’t really know the people who started it, so we didn’t have a good base of knowledge of the place, and I’ve believed for some time that one of the critical weaknesses in the way that the US has approached many of these interventions is that we didn’t know the places we went into. Afghanistan and Iraq were good examples of getting ahead of our familiarity with a place. And aside from knowledge, you have to have a common view of what the case is—which I felt we lacked in Afghanistan, where we were fighting terrorism and we were building a model democracy, and we would compromise one for the other at almost any moment. That’s not a particularly good way to move ahead.
In Syria, the problem was compounded by closing the embassy and having to work out of neighboring countries. So we didn’t really know the people, we didn’t know the place that well, and then we’re not able to work in the country because of the nature of the conflict. So over the last year we’ve tried to broaden our knowledge of the Syrians, and the depth of our familiarity with them. We’ve used a number of methods to do that, but basically training and equipping the non-violent opposition, the people who had started the revolution. We’ve done that to make them more capable for today and for tomorrow, so we want them to be more capable as a means of bringing an end to the conflict, but also when the conflict ends so that there will be some base of people who are going to be able to continue furthering some of the goals of the revolution when it started. I think right now, as people look at this, they see fragmentation as being the logical outcome of the conflict, and I think that part of it is that you have to prepare for the best-case scenario, because if you go the current direction of the status quo, the situation probably isn’t going to be getting better. I think we have a better idea of what to do if things really go to hell, so you have to imagine what would be a positive scenario.

My feeling now is that the most positive scenario is a fragmentation, with part of the people who are really dedicated to some of the founding ideals of the revolution, which is to function in a more open, more democratic, and more peaceful way. I think that is a possibility, and what we are trying to prepare for. Part of that is to give the training and equipping for communications, so we’ve helped to establish a nation-wide FM network so that the opposition can talk to the people without networking through the regime. We’ve done a lot of other mass media stuff that we think is useful, and we have a base of over 500 Syrians that we’re working with on a regular basis. We’re also looking at going to Congress for more flexibility to help pay for stipends for the defected police and others who are providing for public safety in some of those pockets that the opposition has taken control of. There is still the larger problem of the conflict, which as you know, is obviously the overriding concern. But within that, there is an awful lot that can be done, and that is what we’re trying to do, but the bombing is still the first thing that every Syrian talks to you about, and obviously that issue is still hanging out there.

I think I can do Matt and Rodney’s questions together. One of the key instruments the U.S. Government has is the ability to mobilize—to mobilize its allies, to mobilize the organizations that we’re a part of, and to mobilize our own government. But sometimes one of the problems when we get mobilized is that everyone brings their favorite toy, what they’re used to bringing. I think that comes back to having some greater coherence, and if we really do insist on what is the most important challenge of the place as opposed to everyone showing up in their splendor. I’ve been in endless meetings over the years where people say—the first question that’s asked is we’ve got a terrible situation, what can the United States do? I happen to think that’s the wrong problem, the wrong set of questions. The right question is: What is most needed? Because if we can actually get the people working on the place motivated around what’s most needed, we have a much greater chance of success than if we just bring the splendor of all of our own programs.

Up until about two weeks ago when Van Cliburn died, I described it as the Van Cliburn effect, and there he was on the front page of The New York Times, and I had to stop using his name. Does anybody remember who Van Cliburn was? Remember, he looked like the central casting concert pianist—he had the white hair, he had the tails, he looked spectacular. And he’d sit down, flip up the tails, and he’d sit down—that’s sort of what the U.S. Government does. We arrive in these places, and we have all of this talent, and some money…remember there were some people who said we’d have been better off in Bosnia if we had everything in play, so we put everything in play in Iraq, and it didn’t turn out to be that much more successful, but we’re doing cross finger drills and a whole variety of other things. I think these are places that are just so complex and so difficult to work in—tougher than Washington—and how tough is it to get anything done in Washington? Brutally difficult. So let’s focus on the two or three things that can be felt by the people of the country, because they generally have something that matters more to them than everything else. It’s not like we have a gigantic matrix—we’re not going to get everything right in that country, so we have got to give them hope, we’ve got to give them confidence, we’ve got to get some momentum going, and that’s why focusing on what’s most important to them is what is going to make us the most successful. I think that’s something the United States Government has a real capacity to do, but we’ve got to have self-discipline to do that, as well.

Obviously, the international community is a natural partner. We have about seven countries that are looking at these problems the same way we are and putting money to it, but we’re all fairly small still, and the league is just developing, but I think that’s one way we’ll get more influence.
Alonzo, just finally—I’m sorry to go over a minute or two, here—in terms of the whole of government, I’m finding that there’s tremendous openness to working in partnership within the U.S. Government, and very few people who want to lone-wolf any one of these problems right now. What we’re trying to do is to say: Let’s try to do something concrete. Let’s not just build rosters. This is not a bureaucratic exercise, building capacities…let’s take a real problem, and show that by working together, we can actually have more impact on it. And let’s show the capacity as a result of successes, rather than the more bureaucratic way, which is to say, you give me 300 million bucks, you give me 300 people, and I’ll deliver this for you tomorrow. I think that this model is not going to work quite as well these days as taking on real cases, finding how we complement each other, and then making sure that the people who are best suited have the most leadership responsibility, and has more implementation responsibility, and not a natural default to either a bureau, or an agency or any other part of the government.
It’s hard to do that. It doesn’t sit quite right with our practices, but our practices have not been so endearing that every taxpayer in the country is cheering us right now. I think we have an opportunity to try something a little bit different and probably build more support.
Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you all very much. Please join me in thanking Rick Barton.
(Applause)

BACKGROUND: SECRETARY KERRY'S TRIP TO JORDAN

FROM: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Background Briefing on the Secretary's Trip to Amman
Special Briefing
Senior State Department Official
Via Teleconference
May 21, 2013

MODERATOR: Thank you. So this is a conference call to preview the Secretary’s trip to Amman, Jordan tomorrow for his meeting with the London 11. We have on the phone [Senior State Department Official], who will be known here forward as a Senior State Department Official, who’ll give a quick overview and then take some questions. And we’ll try to go around the room since I’m here anyway.

So [Senior State Department Official], whenever you’re ready.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay. I just have a couple of things to say at the start. The Secretary’s meetings here tomorrow are part of a broader American effort that’s been ongoing especially since the Secretary took office to work with partners on Syria. So he’s again meeting the same group of countries, the same foreign ministers with whom he met in Istanbul on April 20th.

And it’s basically to review where we are on Syria, and obviously there’s going to be a discussion both about the situation on the ground in the country; I’m sure there will be a discussion of the refugee situation since the Turkish and Jordanian foreign ministers will be there. There will certainly be a discussion about Geneva, and there’ll be a discussion about what things our countries need to be doing in the days and weeks ahead. So it is part of an ongoing set of discussions. It is not by itself a particularly – it’s not a place where we’re coming to make big decisions because we’re in touch with these countries regularly anyway. So I would urge that people understand it’s part of a consultation and consensus-building effort rather than a make-or-break summit or some such thing.

Why don’t I stop there, [Moderator].

MODERATOR: Okay, great. Well, why don’t we go around. Michael, why don’t you start. Michael Gordon.

QUESTION: Hi, [Senior State Department Official]. Michael Gordon. At the Istanbul meeting a month ago, Secretary Kerry announced that the United States would be sending nonlethal assistance to the armed Syrian opposition that went beyond the food rations and the medical kits that are being provided. What equipment, what additional nonlethal assistance is going to be sent to the armed opposition, and when do you plan to send it since it has yet to be delivered? And who in the Syrian opposition is going to this meeting in Geneva?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: With respect to the assistance, the nonlethal assistance to the Supreme Military Command of the Free Syrian Army, we have not yet delivered the next tranche of assistance. We are continuing right now with the deliveries of food supplies and medical supplies. And in fact, today there was another delivery and there was one last week as well.

Michael, we first need to inform the Congress of what we intend to send in the next tranche, the additional assistance that Kerry announced in Istanbul. And so rather than have the Congress read about it in the New York Times, I’d like us to get our notification up to the Hill. But we will certainly be looking at doing things that will help build the Supreme Military Command’s logistical capabilities, and basically we are working with them from sort of a set of things that they have asked us to help them with. So we’ll get that notification up to Congress shortly, I hope.

With respect to Geneva and the opposition’s attendance, I don’t think any of the different opposition elements have yet announced definitively whether or not they will attend. And of course, the opposition, the political opposition, is in the middle of meetings right now in Istanbul to pick a new leadership. So we will work intensely with that new leadership in the run-up to Geneva.

MODERATOR: Brad.

QUESTION: Yes, [Senior State Department Official], Brad Klapper from AP. Can I just ask you about the situation on the ground? And I won’t try to pronounce the name of the town, but there’s been heavy fighting in – well, I’ll try – al-Qusayr. Are you worried that as time goes on planning this Geneva conference that Assad’s forces are trying to change the situation on the ground as much as possible in their benefit ahead of any future peace talks and that this will complicate chances for peace going forward?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, first let me say a couple of things about the fighting in Qusayr, which is up near Homs. It’s southwest of the city of Homs. It is the most visible effort we have seen of Hezbollah to engage directly in the fighting in Syria as a foreign force. We understand there are also Iranians up there. That is what the Free Syrian Army commanders are telling us. I think this is an important thing to note, the direct implication of foreigners fighting on Syrian soil now for the regime.

There are real concerns, Brad. We have heard from the Syrian opposition that when the regime forces go into Qusayr, if they do capture it, that there will be retaliation against the civilian population, and there are still thousands of civilians in the city. They’re especially nervous about this after the massacres committed by regime militias in Banias, which is just down the road maybe 30 minutes and where several hundreds were killed. And so it is important that the regime know that the world is watching this and we’re watching this, and we will know if they commit massacres, and we will know who it was that committed it, and they will be held accountable. And I want to make that very clear. The way the Syrians are shelling the city with civilians in it is just part of a -- (phone ringing) --

QUESTION: Keep going. Sorry.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- is reprehensible. With respect to the Syrian regime’s strategy leading up to Geneva, I would just say that we have long said – and the Secretary has said – that it is important to change Bashar al-Assad’s calculations in order to get to a political settlement and that the balance on the ground – the military balance on the ground is a huge factor in those calculations, and we understand that. And so one of the things we’ll be talking about here in Amman tomorrow is what else needs to be done with respect to the military balance on the ground.

QUESTION: It’s Arshad Mohammed of Reuters. Two things. One, Special Envoy Brahimi has said that both the opposition and the government are preparing to take part in a Geneva 2 meeting. Is that your understanding? Do you have any reason to believe that any decisions have yet been taken on either side to actually commit to coming? And secondly, can you elaborate on the reports that – you said that you understand that there are Iranians up in Qusayr. Do you have any sense of how many? Are they fighting on the ground? What are they actually doing? And how confident are you in these reports that you have?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’ll talk about the Iranians first. The source of our information about the Iranians is coming from Free Syrian Army commanders that are involved in the fighting and with whom we are in touch as well as the Hezbollah. So it is – that’s who’s claiming that there are Iranians on the ground.

With respect to the Syrian Government’s participation in the opposition, participation in Geneva, the Syrian Government has – there have been press reports, in fact, I think maybe from Reuters that the Syrian Government has named a delegation led by Prime Minister Halqi and which includes a deputy prime minister and several other ministers. For us, the important thing is to – for them to understand that the purpose of this new meeting in Geneva is to discuss how to implement fully – and I want to emphasize those words – how to implement fully the Geneva communiqué, which stipulates that there will be a transition governing body established with full executive authority, including over the military and the security apparatus and that will be established by mutual consent. I have not heard yet from the opposition definitively that they will attend. But as I said, that is – as they come out of their leadership meetings, that is something we will certainly be talking to them about.

QUESTION: Just for the record, I think our story was citing Western diplomats as saying that the Syrian Government had put forward a series of names, including the ones that you cited, the Prime Minister and so on, as a possible delegation. But I don’t think it constituted the Syrian Government themselves committing that those people would actually show up.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, so we need to wait then for Damascus to make a final announcement.

MODERATOR: All right.

QUESTION: This is David Rohde from the Atlantic and Reuters. I’m just (inaudible) following up on Arshad’s question. Can you say anything more about the Iranians, the number of Iranians?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No. I can’t. I’m just relaying what I have heard from multiple commanders up in the Homs battlefield area. We’ve talked to several.

QUESTION: And you’d never heard these types of reports before? And are they fighting? Are advising, supplying anything?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I just can’t answer that question, I’m sorry. I don’t – to be very frank, I don’t have any estimates of numbers and I don’t know that they are directly involved in the fighting, but I don’t think the people that I’m talking to know that themselves. So – but they say that there is both Hezbollah on the ground as well as Iranians on the ground.

QUESTION: And just in terms of the opposition, there’s the separate meetings in Madrid that are happening. Some of the jihadist groups in the opposition are already rejecting peace talks. Are you concerned about who will go to Geneva from the opposition side and if they’ll actually represent the people fighting on the ground from the opposition?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, again, I don’t think anyone, including the people in Madrid, made a final determination about whether or not they would go to Geneva. Most of them said they will postpone any decision for a couple of weeks. This goes back to what I was saying before about leadership issues being resolved in Istanbul for the opposition coalition. And many of the groups that were in Madrid are not in the opposition coalition. They’re smaller opposition groups or conglomerations. So the delegation that would represent the opposition has not been assembled, who would participate in that delegation has not been determined, and so there’s still a great deal in play on the opposition side.

But the first thing to do is for the opposition coalition, which we and the Friends of Syria all have recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. We need that opposition coalition to resolve its leadership questions and then turn to address its stance on Geneva. First things first.

MODERATOR: Indira.

QUESTION: Hi, [Senior State Department Official], this Indira Lakshmanan from Bloomberg News. Thanks for doing this.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Hi, Indira.

QUESTION: I wanted to ask – hi – I wanted to ask: So you don’t know the number of the IRGC troops on the ground and if they’re in battle or just advisory. Do you know the number of the Hezbollah troops on the ground, and again if they’re in battle or just advisory. And connected to that, can you tell us the status of the sort of "milk run" resupplies coming from Iran, what’s coming in and how often? And then just in terms of today with the Saudi Crown Prince in Turkey, are we going to be seeing aid to the rebels increase? And after the Turkish meeting with --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: With respect to the Hezbollah, I don’t have estimates of numbers. But we have reports from several of the commanders that Hezbollah fighters are directly engaged in fighting literally on the streets. They say that their men from some of these battalions of the Supreme Military Command are directly fighting Hezbollah fighters. They say, for example, that they have Lebanese accents. So they know that they’re not Syrians. But again, I don’t have any estimates of numbers.

With respect to Iranian supplies going in, we have long expressed our concern about that; it’s not something new, but it is something that we continue to press the Iraqis to inspect those planes to make sure that there are not lethal materials going in. And it’s something we will continue to watch.

Your – I’m sorry, Indira, what was your third question?

QUESTION: Yeah, I was asking about the Saudi Crown Prince in Turkey today --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Oh, yeah.

QUESTION: -- and whether – that’s following up, obviously, on Erdogan and Obama meeting last week, and are we going to see an increase in aid to the rebels because of the Saudi visit to Turkey. Is that in the works?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: What I would say is all of this happens as – within a group of countries, the Friends of Syria. And then this meeting tomorrow in Amman is to bring all of the key players in the region as well as the key partners in Europe and the United States together to talk about strategy. And so what I would suggest to you is that for sure the Saudis and the Turks have a lot of concerns about what’s going on in Syria. I don’t know if arms are directly on their agenda, but I think all of the countries that are meeting tomorrow, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have already expressed their support for a political solution. They did that in Istanbul in their joint declaration. They also expressed their strong support for helping the Supreme Military Command and General Idris as one of the things necessary to help make a political solution possible by more effectively changing the balance on the ground.

MODERATOR: Scott.

QUESTION: What about Iran coming to Geneva 2?

MODERATOR: Did you hear that?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It’ll be –

MODERATOR: Did you hear that, [Senior State Department Official]?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. We have long, long viewed Iran’s role in Syria as a very pernicious one, even before the Syrian revolution started. That is not a secret. Iran’s actions since the revolution has started we have also criticized steadfastly; I remember doing it when I was still at the American Embassy in Damascus. So our views about Iran and what it’s doing in Syria are well known.

The final invite list for the Geneva conference is still being worked on. We are talking to – it’ll be an issue tomorrow, I am sure, on the agenda of the 11 foreign ministers meeting here in Jordan. But also we have to talk to countries that are not here. We’ll certainly have to talk to the Russians more, and we’ll have to talk also to the United Nations because they very well will have a big role. And so that final attendance list is still under discussion and I’m not quite sure where it’s going to come out yet.

MODERATOR: Anne?

QUESTION: Anne Gearan, Washington Post. Hi, [Senior State Department Official]. Following on that, two things: How could you possibly have a conference about the meaningful future of Syria without including one of the major instrumental combatants? And secondly, are we now, based on your earlier comments about Iranian fighters being involved, looking at a proxy war? I mean, you’re talking about arming the rebels on one side and the Iranians are clearly arming the others and fighting on behalf of the others on the other side. Are we now basically in a war with Iran?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The revolution in Syria started with Syrians and Syrians are carrying the heavy burden of the fighting and the casualties – not Iran, not Hezbollah, and not a small group of foreign fighters fighting on the opposition’s side. And so I think in the end Syrians – because they’re the ones carrying all the burden and carrying the vast majority of the fighting – Syrians are going to be the ones that make the peace. And my understanding is that the Syrian Government is welcoming Iranian help and Hezbollah help. And so that Syrian Government that agrees to negotiate and implement fully the Geneva communiqué and the transition governing body’s establishment can also be the one that asks the Iranians to leave. So I do not view Iranian participation at the next Geneva session as vital.

Remind me, Anne, your second question. Oh, the proxy war? I go back to what I said. Certainly there are – foreigners are playing a role. Iran’s role and Hezbollah’s role has grown substantially over the last couple of months, very pernicious. But Syrians are shouldering the vast majority of the casualties, the vast majority of the fighting, and in the end, they’re Syrian towns or Syrian people that are getting harmed. So --

MODERATOR: Jo, are you on the phone? Oh, operator, can you see if there’s a – if you can get Jo Biddle, who’s on the phone, who may either hit the button or maybe you could just log her in here?

OPERATOR: Jo’s line is open.

QUESTION: Hello?

MODERATOR: Hi, Jo.

QUESTION: Hello, hello. Hi, thanks very much indeed. Sorry, I decided to stay up in the room. I wanted to ask [Senior State Department Official], if I may: How confident are you that in fact this Geneva conference will go ahead? Because there seems to be still a lot of uncertainties and unknowns, and as you say, the invite list is still being worked on. And I wondered also if you could say what was the reasoning behind not inviting the Syrian opposition to tomorrow’s meeting in Amman. Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: First, let me answer the second question first. The Syrian opposition has been invited to Amman, both General Idris or a representative from him for the Supreme Military Command as well as the political opposition, the opposition forces coalition. So they’ve both been invited. I’m not sure exactly yet who is attending.

With respect to how confident we are about Geneva 2, this is the most serious effort in the last two years to get the Syrian Government to sit down and negotiate with the Syrian opposition. In my experience, we haven’t seen a push that has such clear support from the Russians, from the United Nations, and from states in the region. I am not saying that it’s easy. There are lots of pitfalls and you all know them as well as I do. But I also think we have made some progress and we have identified issues that have to be resolved in order to have the conference, and we have time to work on those. So I don’t – I’m not particularly worried about where we are.

As I said, in terms of getting the opposition to the table, the first thing is for the opposition coalition to resolve its leadership questions so that then the new leaders can figure out how to use Geneva to their advantage in terms of standing up a transitional government that does not include Bashar al-Assad.

MODERATOR: Last but not least.

QUESTION: Hi, it’s Sejla with the TV pool here. Can you just briefly update us on where the Russians are in this picture given the developments of last week, with the ships in the Mediterranean and the missiles?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, the Russians on the one hand strongly support, they say, holding this conference in Geneva. But on the other hand, they are continuing to deliver weapons – very modern weapons, very dangerous weapons – to the Syrian regime, and we don’t find that helpful, as you know. We have spoken publicly about that, as well as in private. So I would – I’m going to let the Russians characterize their own policy for you, but I would just say while we welcome their help in the full implementation of the Geneva communiqué and the establishment of a transitioned governing body with full executive authorities, formed by mutual consent, if they’re willing to help us on that, that’s terrific. But providing weapons to the regime at the same time doesn’t seem likely, to us, to induce a positive negotiating stance from the Syrian regime.

QUESTION: If I could just follow up, would maybe pulling those ships from the Mediterranean be a point that would move the talks forward and bring the Russians a little bit closer to the United States and the Friends of Syria?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’m not at all sure about that. I think what is of greater concern to the people that will be meeting here in Amman tomorrow are both Russian arms deliveries and then the Russian political support for the regime, including its support in the United Nations Security Council.

MODERATOR: All right, Indira. Only because Brad says, you get one more.

QUESTION: Oh, Brad is the --

QUESTION: Brad, you’re overruled. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: All right, so just quickly, [Senior State Department Official]: So who is supplying – how is Assad getting his hard cash right now? And on these Russian weapons supplies, is it your understanding that they’re just finishing out existing contracts or are there new contracts that are being fulfilled?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Certainly there are contracts that predate the outbreak of the Syrian revolution that the Russians are delivering equipment under. Of course, that doesn’t mean that they couldn’t suspend deliveries given the extraordinary circumstances in which Syria now finds itself, but legalistically, they are correct; these are old contracts. There are many reports that we get from Syrian opposition sources of additional Russian arms deliveries. And certainly the regime is consuming prodigious amounts of military supplies right now, lots of bombs being dropped and ammunition being fired.

So where do they get their cash? Frankly, if I had a better idea, we could target it better. We have expressed our concerns to the Russians in the past about Russian banks’ interactions with the regime. I’m not saying that the Russians are bankrolling the Assad regime; I don’t think they are, but I think they do in some cases facilitate the Syrian banking sector’s access to the broader international banking sector. And so that is something we are talking to them about.

But I also think the regime is slowly running out of cash. The exchange rate in Damascus on the Syrian pound has dropped steadily. My understanding now is that it’s under 100 to the American dollar, and that suggests to us that little by little the regime’s reserves are dwindling.

MODERATOR: Okay, really the last one. Arshad, wrap it up.

QUESTION: Sorry to bother you with this one, but I still don’t understand what you think the Iranians that you are told are on the ground in Qusayr are actually doing. I mean, it just seems odd that one has no sense of whether they’re advising or fighting or arming or whether they’re just sort of bystanders.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don’t think they’re arming because I’ve not heard that, but I think they could be doing a little of both advising and fighting. The reports that we’re getting, Arshad, are not consistent. So what is consistent is they’re all saying that there are Iranians up there, so that is consistent. Then what they’re doing in particular, I get different reports.

What I would say is this, though: that we know that Iran and Hezbollah cooperate in a number of countries, not just in Syria. And so it is not a surprise that Iran would be there with Hezbollah on the ground. We do have consistent reports of Hezbollah fighters on the ground.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MODERATOR: Thank you, [Senior State Department Official], for taking the time, and we’ll all see you tomorrow.