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Following are links to various U.S. government press releases.

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Showing posts with label ISAF JOINT COMMAND. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ISAF JOINT COMMAND. Show all posts

Thursday, March 29, 2012

IN AFGHANISTAN COALITION FORCES WORK TO AVERT "INSIDER" ATTACKS


The following excerpt is from the Department of Defense American Forces Press Service website:



Afghans, Coalition Work to Avert 'Insider' Attacks

By Karen Parrish
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, March 26, 2012 - Afghan and coalition leaders are working to limit "insider threat" killings in Afghanistan, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces there told reporters here today.
Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen said at a Pentagon news conference that Afghan and coalition forces have changed their operations to address the killing of coalition members by Afghan soldiers or police forces, also known as "green-on-blue" events.

Fifteen coalition members have been killed in such events this year. "I think you're aware that tragically we had one overnight, as two young British soldiers were killed in Helmand province," Allen said.
Afghan leaders have put in place an eight-step vetting process, Allen said, and have placed counterintelligence operatives in army and police schools, recruiting centers and within the ranks "to spot and assess the potential emergence of an individual who could be an extremist or, in fact, a Taliban infiltrator."
The general said some breakthroughs have taken place, as Afghan investigators have arrested people in uniform who potentially could have been perpetrators of "green-on-blue" violence.
"So the process is actually working," he added.

Allen said he has directed International Security Assistance Force troop-contributing nations to increase training for their deploying forces. ISAF troops, he added, have changed sleeping, basing and guard arrangements to better-protect coalition troops.

"Between what the Afghans have done for themselves, what we're doing for ourselves and how we're partnering together, we seek to reduce this tragedy to the maximum extent possible," he said.
While the Taliban take credit for all such attacks, Allen said, the majority are not a direct result of Taliban infiltration. But it's no secret that the Taliban have for some time tried to infiltrate Afghan forces and elements that support Afghan and coalition forces directly, he noted.

In most cases, the relationship between Afghan and coalition troops is strong, the general said. Still, he acknowledged, the attacks are one characteristic of counterinsurgency campaigns.
"We experienced these in Iraq, [and] we experienced them in Vietnam," Allen said. "On any occasion where you're dealing with an insurgency and where you're also growing an indigenous force -- which will ultimately be the principal opposition to that insurgency -- the enemy's [going to] do all that they can to disrupt the counterinsurgency operations, but also disrupt the integrity of the indigenous forces that develop."

Monday, December 26, 2011

AFGHAN BORDER INCIDENT PROMPTS CHANGES


The following excerpt from  the American Forces Press Service Department of Defense website:

"Mattis Directs Corrective Actions Following Pakistan Border Incident
By Cheryl Pellerin
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Dec. 26, 2011 - Drawing on findings from the investigation into the deadly Nov. 25-26 incident near Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, U.S. Central Command commander Marine Corps Gen. James R. Mattis directed the International Security Assistance Force to take a series of corrective actions.
The actions, directed to ISAF Commander Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen, are intended to correct problems of mistrust and miscommunication among those working in the border area. Those kinds of problems led to the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers.

U.S. Central Command today released an unclassified version of the investigation report by its investigating officer, Air Force Brig. Gen. Stephen Clark, director of plans, programs, requirements and assessments for Air Force Special Operations Command.

"The strongest take-away from this incident," Mattis said in a statement, "is the fundamental fact that we must improve border coordination, and this requires a foundational level of trust on both sides of the border."

On the night of Nov. 25-26, an Afghan National Army Commando company, partnered with U.S. Army Special Forces, landed near Maya Village in Afghanistan's Khas Konar District in an area of operations assigned by ISAF to its Regional Command-East.

According to the report, these ground forces were executing Operation Sayaqa, approved by ISAF Joint Command headquarters, when they came under fire from positions on a ridge near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In self defense they used air support to engage the ridgeline positions. The air engagement ended 90 minutes later and had included about 45 minutes of fire. Fire from positions near the ridge had stopped. Eventually, it became clear from various information exchanges that those engaged at the ridge were Pakistan military personnel.

In the early hours of Nov. 26, the report said, supporting aircraft pulled back from the border area and Pakistani authorities reinforced their border positions and reportedly removed 24 dead and 13 wounded.

The ground forces completed Operation Sayaqa. They left the area shortly after midnight on Nov. 27, arriving back at their base later that morning.”

As a result of the investigation and report, Mattis directed Allen to implement the following actions as soon as possible:

- Improve mutual trust among those working in the border areas.

- Clarify authorities, responsibilities and standard operating procedures for command, control and communication in near-border operations and develop formal training exercises and drills.

- Implement a program of full disclosure of all border area facilities and installations on both sides of the border, with systematic updates based on a common database and map.

- Before conducting any operation, direct all future coalition units and formations contemplating near-border area operations to confirm all installations near the border and the planned objective.

- To prevent friendly fire incidents, develop and share with the Pakistan military the common use of force-escalation measures such as show of force and other standard procedures.

- Consider harmonizing ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom rules of engagement to promote clarity and transparency.

Among the investigation's critical findings are that the international law of armed conflict was respected and that rules of engagement -- directions given to military forces that define the conditions, degree and manner in which force may be used -- were appropriately and legally applied.

The report found that the catalyst for the engagement was the opening of fire by Pakistan soldiers and that their continued fire made the situation worse.

The operation was conducted in support of ISAF campaign objectives, the report said, but the issue of Operation Enduring Freedom rules of engagement in an ISAF campaign causes confusion and friction among coalition partners, the report said, and ISAF and OEF orders, standard operating procedures and directives related to border-area operations lack clarity and precision and were not followed.

Also lacking are time-sensitive senior command override measures for border-area incidents and pre-mission near-border coordination for the operation, according to the report.

A series of miscommunications within the chain of command -- but especially in the area of the border coordination nexus -- delayed confirmation of the identity of the Pakistani forces, the report said.

"In the context of this tragedy, a way forward must be found to prevent similar occurrences in the future," Clark said in his concluding comments.

"Over the long term," he added, "the way to ... peace and stability along the border is to be found in resolving the long-standing border disputes that perpetuate a state of uncertainty and mistrust within which local cooperation and coordination efforts are less likely to succeed."