U.S. STATEMENT ON HUMANITARIAN PAUSE FOR YEMEN

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Statement on a Humanitarian Pause for Yemen
Samantha Power
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
New York, NY
July 10, 2015
AS DELIVERED

The United States joins UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in supporting an unconditional humanitarian pause by all parties to the conflict in Yemen from Friday, July 10, at 11:59pm (GMT +3) through the end of the holy month of Ramadan.

The humanitarian situation facing the Yemeni people is critical, with 20 million people—80 percent of the population—in need of water and 13 million people—50 percent of the population—in dire need of food aid. A humanitarian pause is urgently needed so that the United Nations and other international aid organizations can deliver life-saving food and medicine to citizens throughout Yemen. A humanitarian pause should also help accelerate the flow of fuel and commercial goods on which Yemen depends.

We further emphasize that there is no military solution to the conflict in Yemen. As the UN Secretary-General has noted, the parties should continue engaging with the UN to take confidence-building measures toward a durable cease-fire accompanied by a disengagement of forces and the release of political prisoners. To that end, the United States appreciates and fully supports UN Special Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed’s ongoing efforts to bring Yemeni stakeholders to the table to find a path forward to resume Yemen’s political transition, in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the outcomes of the National Dialogue, and relevant Security Council resolutions.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY REGADING SYSRIAN CRISIS

FROM: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The Syrian Humanitarian Crisis
Testimony
Anne C. Richard
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, United States Senate
Washington, DC
March 19, 2013
Introduction

Good afternoon, Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of this committee. Thank you for hosting this hearing today on the humanitarian crisis inside Syria. I am pleased to be able to appear before the Committee with my colleague, USAID Assistant Administrator Nancy Lindborg. Our offices work closely together to provide critical humanitarian aid to those affected by the violence in Syria.

The two year anniversary of the Syria uprising coincides with another dark milestone: over one million refugees have now fled across Syria's borders into neighboring countries. More troubling news is that half of that number arrived in the last two months. The United Nations (UN) estimates that over 2.5 million people are displaced inside Syria and many more have been affected by the upheaval and fighting.

I would like to share with you the approach my bureau in the State Department is taking to address the crisis and how our efforts and USAID's work are complementary and mutually reinforcing... I shall first briefly comment on how the refugee crisis is affecting the neighboring countries, discuss the challenges we face in delivering humanitarian assistance to those in need throughout the region, and provide some specifics on the priorities of the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and our diplomatic outreach to other countries.

Refugees in Neighboring Countries

Countries bordering Syria are approaching a dangerous saturation point with refugees. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in January of this year, 2,000 people fled Syria every day. In February, the number climbed to 5,000 a day; and in March, we've seen 8,000 people a day crossing from Syria into Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. In addition to serving as evidence that life inside Syria has become extremely dangerous for many, the number and the rate are overwhelming the capacity of humanitarian aid organizations to meet the needs of these victims and are sorely testing the limits of host countries' abilities to provide safe shelter. If international borders are closed to Syrians seeking refuge, the awful tally of human destruction will only increase.

Jordan: There are approximately 350,000 refugees in Jordan according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Approximately 70 percent of refugees in Jordan live outside of the refugee camps in cities and towns. Many have been taken in or helped by relatives, friends or even strangers. Only 30 percent live in the Za’atri refugee camp in northern Jordan. The Government of Jordan set up Za’atri in response to the large numbers of refugees crossing the border, and it has moved to set up another camp, as yet uninhabited, and initiated plans for another. Za’atri camp has been plagued by security problems and we have been in active conversations with the UNHCR and the Government of Jordan to improve the safety of refugees there as well as humanitarian workers.

Jordan is allowing refugees to cross its borders but is finding that its resources are stretched to help massive flows of refugees while providing services to its own citizens at the same time. We should note that we are concerned by reports that some Palestinian and Iraqi refugees have been turned around at the border and we have asked the Government of Jordan to let them cross. We’ve thanked the Government of Jordan for its ongoing assistance to the refugee population, and asked them to keep their borders open to all refugees. Knowing the significant economic cost associated with hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees, the U.S. government is providing Jordan with budget support.

Lebanon: Lebanon is hosting over 354,000 Syrian refugees. Lebanon has also taken in 32,000 Palestinian refugees who have fled the violence in Syria. Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in host communities and are not in camps, which allows for greater freedom of movement, greater possibilities for self-sufficiency and a semblance of a normal life. At the same time, the presence of so many refugees in a country of 4 million people taxes Lebanon’s infrastructure and resources and has increased tensions within the refugee-hosting communities. Hizballah's presence in southern Lebanon creates a challenge for UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGO) in providing aid, while its involvement in the Government of Lebanon complicates U.S. efforts to provide help during this crisis. Despite these strains, the Government of Lebanon continues to keep its borders open, though its leaders have warned that Lebanon has reached its saturation point and requires significant international assistance in order to support the refugees.

Iraq: Over 110,000 Syrian refugees have fled to Iraq, and most are now in Kurdistan. Domiz camp in Kurdistan accommodates approximately 54,000 persons, and two camps in Anbar province at Al-Qaim accommodate over 7,500 persons. In addition to those living in camps, there are many who live in villages and communities. In Kurdistan, Syrians are permitted to live and work in the community once they have registered.

Since October 21, 2012, the Government of Iraq has kept the Al-Qaim border crossing with Syria closed, except for medical emergencies and some family reunification cases. Local authorities and the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement state that the border is closed for security reasons. Syrian refugees in Anbar prior to the closure of the border are restricted to the camps, although some have family members nearby. The main reasons for return to Syria continue to be lack of freedom of movement out of the camp and lack of a way to earn a living. UNHCR continues to provide support to those expressing interest in returning to Syria but is not encouraging repatriation because conditions are not conducive to a safe return.

Turkey: Since the beginning of the crisis, the Government of Turkey has supported most of the humanitarian needs of the refugees from Syria who have crossed its border. In addition to 186,200 refugees registered in 17 camps set up by the government and 71,000 registered (or soon to be registered) outside of camps, the Government of Turkey estimates that an additional 100,000 unregistered refugees live in urban areas. While the government has previously focused its support for Syrian refugees on the camp-based populations, it is now beginning to address the needs of the out-of-camp Syrians by setting up centers where urban refugees can register for IDs and free health services. Turkey has a strong economy but is experiencing a decline in its once vibrant cross-border trade with Syria.

Challenges in Crisis Response

The challenges before us are many. USAID Nancy Lindborg’s testimony discusses access, security and funding issues. Therefore, I will focus on: (1) the need to work with host governments to ensure that they keep their borders open to refugees and have what they need to help the refugees; (2) specific contributions made by the PRM bureau; and (3) ensuring that other countries are contributing to humanitarian aspects of the crisis so that the UN and other humanitarian agencies have more of the support they need to respond.

Working with Host Governments

We recognize the huge strain that the influx of refugees is currently placing on countries that neighbor Syria. In both Jordan and Lebanon, government leaders are concerned about their capacity to absorb so many refugees. Iraq has expressed concerns that al-Qaeda and its Syria affiliate, al-Nusrah Front, are sending fighters and weapons across the border. Turkey, for the most part, has maintained an open border policy for all refugees, although each day it limits the number of refugees allowed to cross at border crossings with high traffic. It is essential that neighboring countries continue to keep their borders open for those refugees fleeing violence in Syria. In every meeting with officials from these countries, we thank them for allowing refugees to cross and discuss ways to help them uphold humanitarian principles while safeguarding their own security so that they are protected from a spillover of violence.

It is important that short-term relief programs link to longer-term development aid as part of overall U.S. government aid to the region. This is particularly the case in Jordan and Lebanon. We must leverage other aid and investments and incorporate refugees into the fabric of these countries, in order to minimize the costs that hosting refugees places on communities. This is an important area in which the State Department and USAID are working together.

Department of State Response

The Department and USAID lead the U.S. government’s humanitarian response and we work closely together in response to the crisis. Nancy Lindborg and I have traveled together to the region twice and were also recently joined by Ambassador Ford in Turkey, prior to our participation at the Kuwait Donors Conference in January. Our communications teams are taking advantage of maximizing every opportunity to get the message out to domestic and international audiences about the dimensions of the crisis and to highlight our government’s leadership role in responding.

That said, allow me to outline the role the State Department has in helping to get as much humanitarian aid into Syria as possible through partners. Over several decades, PRM has developed a privileged relationship with the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations. These agencies are a key part of the international humanitarian system that is governed by humanitarian principles. They bring technical expertise and operational capacity to respond to this large-scale crisis. Of the nearly $385 million in humanitarian assistance that USAID and the State Department are providing in response to the Syria crisis, the State Department’s contributions total nearly $185 million. Our contributions provide life-saving emergency assistance to meet basic humanitarian needs, such as shelter, water, sanitation, and health both inside Syria and in host countries.

The delivery of assistance is often undertaken at great personal risk to those distributing the aid. For example, in the past couple of months, two UNHCR convoys and one UN interagency convoy have delivered aid into north-west Syria, where thousands of internally displaced people are in acute need of humanitarian help. The operations were carried out in collaboration with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and the local community. Once the convoys moved across battle-lines into areas controlled by the opposition, the missions were facilitated by the Syrian Opposition Coalition. Such operations are dangerous and difficult, which underscores the need for unhindered and safe access for those providing humanitarian assistance inside Syria. We will continue to encourage the UN to do more such cross-line assistance deliveries, counting on the Syrian Opposition Coalition to help coordinate and negotiate safe access. While these convoys are good, much more is needed to ensure supplies consistently and safely reach people in need.

Of course, people in need are not concentrated in one area and instead can be found on both sides of shifting battle-lines. Humanitarian organizations provide aid in a neutral and impartial manner. The United Nations is seeking to get access to all communities in need on a regular basis. It is unacceptable and a violation of humanitarian principles for the Syrian regime to deny this access.

I should also mention the plight of the 525,000 Palestinian refugees who were living in Syria prior to the start of the conflict. They, too, have been caught up in the violence in Syria. Fighting has engulfed many Palestinian refugee camps and neighborhoods, including in Yarmouk, causing over half of Syria’s Palestinian population to be displaced. For the most part, the Palestinian population has kept away from taking sides in the conflict. Those refugees who remain in camps are the poorest and most vulnerable. Some Palestinians have fled Syria, but most remain inside the country, having heard that they will be turned away at the borders with neighboring countries. The U.S. is the largest bilateral donor to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the UN agency responsible for assisting Palestinian refugees. There are also approximately 63,000 Iraqi refugees inside Syria. In recent months, many other Iraqis who were living as refugees in Syria have chosen to return to Iraq or flee for a second time to other countries.

Contributions of Other Countries

With no end in sight, we are facing a resource crisis. The UN's Regional Response Plan to assist up to 1.1 million Syrian refugees in the region has thus far received only 21 percent of the funds it needs to operate for the first half of 2013 and, as of mid-March, refugee arrivals have already nearly reached June 2013 planning figures. Despite our own budget constraints, the United States continues to make every effort to continue to provide funding to meet the increasing needs. However, it is vital that other donors quickly honor the pledges they have made and provide the cash that agencies need to keep life-saving operations going.

Even if the Asad regime falls soon, displacement and the need for humanitarian aid will continue. This is because of the widespread destruction of Syria's infrastructure and predicted flows of refugees that would continue to cross borders – likely in both directions. If refugees are not able to return for years, host countries will need to continue to help host Syrian children in schools, and help families with medical facilities, and provide other public services.

Using diplomatic channels, we are using every opportunity to ask other donors to follow through on the pledges they made at the Kuwait Donors Conference in January in order to raise the promised $1.5 billion. The Secretary and other Department principals have reached out to other governments to ask them to do more for the Syrian people, including Syrian refugees. Funding is urgently needed if UN agencies and others are able to continue to operate.

Coordination of the international humanitarian response is complex and must occur on multiple levels. The United States participates in meetings in Geneva of the Syria Humanitarian Forum that bring together senior officials from key donor governments, countries affected by the crisis and UN leaders to discuss the humanitarian aspects of the crisis, and to coordinate our collective response. We also actively participate in UN coordination meetings in the field. In addition, we are deepening our coordination with the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit. We have also encouraged UN agencies and other partners to do the same, and are pleased with the initial results.

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that my bureau’s primary concerns are providing protection to and aiding those who have fled the violence. The State Department’s overall goal, of course, is a return of peace and stability to Syria and to one day see the refugees return home.

I am grateful for the generosity of Congress and the American people who make our assistance possible, and for the excellent collaboration with the State Department’s Near East and European bureaus, and USAID colleagues. Thank you once again for the opportunity to highlight PRM’s role and some of our concerns regarding the Syrian humanitarian crisis. I would be happy to answer any of your questions.

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL BRIEFING ON TOKYO CONFERENCE

FROM:  U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Background Briefing on the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan
Special Briefing Senior Department Official
Senior Official Okura Hotel
Tokyo, Japan
July 8, 2012
MODERATOR: All right. We are in Tokyo at the conclusion of the Tokyo conference, and here to talk to you a little about the core group meeting today is [Senior State Department Official], hereafter known as Senior State Department Official. Go ahead, [Senior State Department Official].

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thanks a lot again. I’m sorry to keep you waiting. I’d like to actually just talk about the core group in a minute, but to step back if I could, sort of talk a little bit about the day today because I think two things are really important. Now, first, and again this is – I recognize maybe perhaps more of an interest to me than it is to you, but this idea that we’ve sort of come now to the 8th of July in Tokyo after a series of events really that started in Istanbul last year – Istanbul, Bonn, Chicago, Tokyo – I hope that you’ll be able to think about them a little bit as a whole. The job we were given by Secretary Clinton you’ll recall in her speech at the Asia Society in February of last year was to see if we couldn’t create a diplomatic surge to meet the military and civilian surges that were already going on. And we were committed to try to do so in a way that created a regional context for Afghanistan.

We’re talking about an Afghanistan secure, stable, and prosperous inside of a secure, stable, and prosperous region. And so we thought about Istanbul as the place where the neighbors and the near neighbors of Afghanistan got together to sort of start take responsibility in a regional way for Afghanistan, and then on then to the conference in Bonn which talked about a transformational decade for Afghanistan and really endorsed what the region had said: Yes, this is the vision going forward. Went on to Chicago then, and I think among the most important issues in Chicago was to kind of follow-up the security piece of what was called for in Bonn.

So Bonn had lots of pieces but one was security, one was economic development foreign direct investment in private sector. And then Chicago was about doing the security part of Bonn. And then today in Tokyo what we tried to do is then meet the economic development, private sector, foreign direct investment part of what was called for in Bonn.

So for us – for me anyway – it completes a sequence where we have now a regional structure in place, where we have the transformational decade, where we’ve made the security commitments, and now the economic and development commitments to follow through on our transformational decade. The only other thing that I would want to highlight today is I hope when you have a chance or have had a chance to look at the declaration that was put out today by the Tokyo conference, I think what’s interesting about it is the mutual accountability framework as the annex that’s referred to a number of times in the document.

But you all have been following these kinds of issues for a very long time, and I’d say that the mutual accountability framework is about as specific as we can get. It talks about the requirements of the Afghan Government back to the international community, the international community to Afghanistan. And we hope that document will be a foundation now to sort of judge how everybody’s doing, going forward. So again, as you report this or think about it, I hope that you’d consider the mutual accountability framework as something important. It’s pretty specific and I think quite interesting.

In terms of the core group, the other we’ve tried to accomplish today was to try to bring together the foreign ministers of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States. As you know, the core group was established a year or so ago – I think in April it was when the senior leaders of Pakistan at that time went up to Kabul, talked about Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation. One of the outcomes was, they called for a core group of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States, to meet and talk about reconciliation. That group I think met six or seven times at my level over the past year, year and a half. We hoped at some time we’d be able to put it together at some higher level, and we achieved that today.

And so three things I’d draw to your attention for today: One is the fact that it took place, and we were able to bring the core group together at a ministerial level. Secondly, from my perspective in listening to the conversation, I got to thinking that over time we, the United States, play a role of a facilitator here for this conversation, and that I could see that over time perhaps we’d play less and less of a role. And this is really a conversation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. So I thought that was interesting and sort of my observation is that ought to be something we can try over time. Secondly, we did, at the core group meeting in Islamabad a few weeks ago, tried to announce – set up some specific efforts that the group would make, such as to make sure that everyone’s following the United Nations’ 1988 process on travel of people who are listed, and other sort of coordination mechanisms. And then thirdly --

MODERATOR: Who are listed on the international sanctions list.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sanctioned under the 1988 list. And then thirdly, we did issue a statement today and I thought the fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan were prepared to make a similar – a call today together to the armed opposition to lay down their weapons, to get into negotiation, had its utility. And we tried to kind of lay out a vision for what the future would be like and then call people (inaudible) to that vision. So --

MODERATOR: Do you want to do a little bit on this first meeting after the GLOCs between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Khar?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I can only do a little in the sense that the Secretary – we wanted to have the meeting today in advance of the core group meeting so that we kind of could lay out for Pakistanis as we had for the Afghans about what we were trying to accomplish at the core group.

Secretary decided to do it one on one to sort of show the kind of intensity of kind of her engagement in this. You can imagine that all the checklist of items were discussed, but they were together for about an hour and they did it just the two of them.

MODERATOR: Questions? Arshad.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, please. Arshad.

QUESTION: So the Secretary said that the United States was – is going to try to build into the aid that it has pledged incentives for Afghanistan to enact reforms and fight corruption. Can you tell us what those incentives are or what disincentives there might be if the money won’t come if things don’t improve on corruption? And then secondly, listening to the Secretary at the news conference with Foreign Minister Gemba, it’s not clear to me that the solving the land routes issue is going to do much of anything to secure more direct Pakistani activity on counterterrorism. What is your impression of that?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay. Both fair questions. First, let me talk about the question on incentives. Again, that’s why I would refer you to the mutual accountability framework and one of the things that we tried very hard to build was this idea that certain percentages – 5, 10, and then increasing numbers – of U.S. assistance ought to be connected to meeting the obligations in the mutual accountability framework, not just in terms of corruption, but good governance and a whole list of things in that area.

And so this is really the first time we’ve been able to get everybody to agree that there ought to be these percentages – the percentages ought to keep growing. So I think that was – it’s a step forward. And if you tie the percentages to the specificity of the mutual accountability framework, I think it answers your question.

In terms of counterterrorism, my answer is we’ll see. The thing that was for sure is that in many ways the fact that the GLOCs were closed was getting in the way kind of a lot of conversation with Pakistan. Now that the GLOCs are open, we have an opportunity, it seems to me, to go back into kind of business with them, and counterterrorism is one of those areas. So we’ll see.

MODERATOR: Brad.

QUESTION: I have two questions. Just the first on the funding, I think several – well, many people expected that it would go further beyond 2015, I was just wondering what was the thinking beyond really only going one year past the 2014 mark? Does it really set it as long-term as maybe one might have expected? And then secondly, I understand there was something of a kerfuffle related to the Italians who put some stronger language on the women’s rights and there was some back and forth on that. What are your concerns? Why was there some Afghan pushed back on that?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, on the first, I’d say two things. One is that, I think the Japanese concluded that if they could have people talk about sort of commitment – 2015 to 2017, actually is what they were talking about – that given sort of structures in governments, the length of governments, that that was, for many countries, that was as far out as they could look. But I thought it was interesting, I think the Swedes today made a commitment for the whole transformation decade. So I think certain countries made their own decisions. The Swedes I think they went in for the whole 10 years and other countries did as well.

So everybody’s got their system, and we have our own system, too. We have Congress and we have to seek annual appropriations. The Secretary was pretty clear in her intervention, and as we said all along, that we were going to look for and seek funding at or near the levels that we’ve sought for the past 10 decades. Other people’s systems work --

MODERATOR: Ten years.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Ten years – past decade.

MODERATOR: You said the past 10 decades.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Not 10 decades. (Laughter.) Sorry, I
am a little tired.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’m sorry, yes that’s right, there you go. That’s right – I’ll be a hero at the Treasury Department. So everybody’s got their own system and I think the Japanese just thought that’s what they could do. But – the Swedes and I think somebody else – but anyway, the Swedes I know for sure went in for the whole 10 years because they were able to do so.

In terms of the other question, there was just an effort by I think every country around the table to make sure that the document is a declaration itself and the mutual accountability framework was as strong as possible on women’s issues and these – there’s a negotiation about all of these things, but there was absolutely unified view all around the table that the women’s issues were important that ought to be mentioned as much as possible, as strongly as possible. And you could ask him, but I was struck by, in the last session of – the closing session of the conference – both Foreign Minister Rassoul and the Finance Ministers (inaudible) said, “We’ve got your message on a whole list of things, but certainly women’s rights was part of that.”

QUESTION: So these were Afghanistan and --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Both. Both Afghanistan. Rassoul is the Foreign Minister and Zakhilwal the Finance Minister.

MODERATOR: I would just add to that that President Karzai was very, very strong on this whole complex of issues and that the gains women have made in Afghanistan are a litmus test of the country’s development and it can’t be allowed to roll back when he met with the Secretary yesterday in Kabul.

QUESTION: So --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Let me see – I have just one other thing and that’s one of the reasons that we did – that the Secretary this afternoon met with civil society groups, so we could make that point again and make it in public.
Sorry, Jane.

MODERATOR: Jane.

QUESTION: So that accountability framework implies for the whole $16 billion, right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Correct. Correct.

QUESTION: So, I mean in plain language, the – from 5 to 20 percent is conditioned on what the Afghans do in meeting anticorruption measures?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And meeting the requirements of the mutual accountability framework.

QUESTION: Which is – and it’s up to 20 percent of the $16 billion?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, let’s see. I don’t want to --

MODERATOR: Dan briefed us on the plane and he said that, whereas we had started at 10 percent, it’s basically up to 20 percent and that was one of the gains.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It’s in here.

MODERATOR: It’s in the annex.

QUESTION: Well, so the question I really want to ask about is --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, it’s paragraph 13 of the annex.

QUESTION: -- (inaudible) – the Haqqanis. Did you – did the Secretary press the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that more had to be done about the Haqqanis this afternoon?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: As she always does, sure.

QUESTION: As she always does. So what was the new twist in here? Since they haven’t spoken about it for six months, what else did you have to say about it besides the usual?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I mean, the usual is that we want them to do more – we want them to increase the pressure on the Haqqanis.
QUESTION: And what was the response?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Their response is that they intend to do more.

QUESTION: So they recognize that the Haqqanis are in their territory?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I think one of the important things here is – what we’ve been saying to them is go back to your parliament’s declaration. What’s that parliament declaration say? Parliament declaration says no foreign fighters. Nobody should attack other countries from our territory. We shouldn’t be the base for terrorist, sects, and other people, the argument is, “So, your parliament has said this. That’s your policy, so find ways to live up to it.”

QUESTION: I got lost.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Please.

QUESTION: On the mutual accountability and the 5 to 20 percent, how are you actually going to monitor compliance?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, it’s in there. There’s a whole thing on the joint JCMB – the whatever it says – the joint – the JCMB. There’s a whole series of compliance frameworks there.

QUESTION: And then, also back on the issue of women’s rights in Afghanistan, I was struck by the Secretary’s speech and how strongly she had defended that and with your comments just now. Are you very worried that women’s rights are being rolled back in Afghanistan right now?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We’re just trying to set a – I think everyone’s trying to set a standard. And the standard is that as you go forward here with all the things they – with all their requirements, that women’s rights remain one of the fundamental interests of all of the countries – certainly represented there today. And I’d say the people who spoke for Afghanistan as well.

QUESTION: Did you say at risk?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’m sorry?

QUESTION: Risk. I mean, there seems to be – there was a recent --

QUESTION: Marital (inaudible.)

QUESTION: Yes. Yes. That would suggest that there was some – perhaps a roll back to these rights.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I certainly think in areas where the insurgents are, what do you see? You see women’s rights being rolled back. And the other thing is, I think it’s important, as you report this – as people head towards 2014, there’s still a very large amount of anxiety inside of Afghanistan that the international community’s just going to depart. And so one of the reasons to keep reinforcing not just the message on women’s rights, but one of the reasons we signed a strategic partnership agreement with them, one of the reasons that there’s a commitment for the transformation decade, one of the reasons that people are looking forward is to try to inject into the psyche and debate inside of Afghanistan that 2014 is not the end of international engagement there.
MODERATOR: Let’s take --

QUESTION: There’s – on to Pakistan --

MODERATOR: Let’s – can I just let people that haven’t had a chance at all? Thank you.

QUESTION: So we can read the mutual accountability framework. Can you back it up a little bit for us and tell us how you identified where the most corruption was and how you focused and crafted that wording? Where along the line was the corruption that you decided you could effect by wording things the way you did?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I mean, it says what it says – I don’t know how to answer your question.

QUESTION: No, I’m not asking what it says. I’m saying, how was it – the process of deciding where along the line you’re finding the most corruption. Where is the problem of corruption right now among the transmission --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think as the Afghans said this afternoon, and I think as President Karzai said in the opening session, that corruption is in their society and they need to take care of it. And so one of the reasons there are indicators in the mutual accountability framework is for precisely that reason, is so that people can judge against them.

QUESTION: But that’s (inaudible) --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I mean we took – in a number of these areas of the mutual accountability framework, you take the indicators that you can, you try to make the best – you say, well, here if these things were done, we’d make some progress. So that’s what they indicated --

MODERATOR: If I could just – most of this is based on the analysis that the World Bank makes and they’ve been sort of the baseline, as they are in all countries, for standards of corruption et cetera and the best techniques for attacking it.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) percentages.

MODERATOR: We’ve got one more here.

QUESTION: The Japanese say there’s going to be no mechanical cut off of aid despite the percentages, and the percentages seem to only be geared towards the Afghan reconstruction trust fund. How confident are you that, in fact, these are real meaningful goals that have teeth, and that if they’re not met, in fact money will be shut off?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I think that the tenor of the conversation today was that mutual accountability is mutual accountability, which is to say that the international community has made these commitments to Afghanistan, Afghanistan has made commitments back, and people have to keep them. And again, I thought that the Finance Minister at the end of the day today said, “Look, we understand this is really hard on your politics. Your taxpayers want to know if they’re getting their money’s worth. It’s our job now to meet our requirements. So that’s what we’re going to do.”

QUESTION: Can we ask one about the money, because I think this an important issue? The Secretary’s language, that you’re going to seek from Congress an amount, add from here what you thought over the last 10 years, to me has a sort of tremendous ambiguity to it, because I went and looked at the CRS’s calculation, and it goes from $970 million to a peak of about $4 billion in 2010 and then down to about 2.3 for FY2012. And it’s sort of like my kid saying, I’m going to try to achieve grades at or near the level that I’ve achieved over the last decade and that range length from say a “D” to an “A+”. And so it’s not clear to me if the kid’s going to try to get a “B” or if at or near the “D” is good enough to meet the standards set in this language.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right.

QUESTION: So I understand you guys are loathe to give a specific dollar figure because you’ve got to deal with Congress, but I also understand that one has no real idea. It seems to me it could be anywhere at or near the low end of that or the high end of it.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. I’m not going to go any farther than that. We’re just going to have to see.

STATUS OF CAMP ASHRAF RESIDENTS

FROM:  U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
Status of the Processing of the Camp Ashraf Residents
Testimony Ambassador Daniel Fried, Special Advisor on Ashraf
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Washington, DC
May 16, 2012
Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking Member Carnahan, thank you for the opportunity today to testify before this Subcommittee. I welcome this occasion to report on the significant progress made in the Administration’s ongoing efforts to  support a humane, peaceful, and durable solution for the residents of Camp Ashraf, as well as on the challenges that remain.

In early December 2011, when I last appeared before this Subcommittee to discuss the situation at Camp Ashraf, the potential for a humanitarian crisis appeared ominous. The Government of Iraq had announced its intention to close Camp Ashraf by December 31, and there were valid concerns, based on previous incidents, that this could result in bloodshed. At that time, the United States and the UN recognized the need to develop and support on an urgent basis a mechanism to achieve the safety and security of Ashraf’s residents. Members of this Committee appeared to share such concerns. It was under these circumstances that Secretary Clinton instructed me to work with Ambassador Jeffrey and the United Nations to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.

Given that context, I am relieved to report significant progress, while recognizing that the job is not yet done. On December 25, the Government of Iraq and the United Nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that provides the mechanism and path forward for the safe relocation of Ashraf’s residents out of Iraq. Secretary Clinton quickly and publicly announced our support for this MOU, and we were shortly joined in this support by key partners in the international community, especially the European Union. We called upon the Iraqi government to respect the terms of the MOU and upon the residents of Camp Ashraf to cooperate in its implementation. With the signature of the MOU, the Iraqi government lifted the December 31 deadline for Ashraf’s closure.
Under the terms of the MOU, the residents of Camp Ashraf have been provided a temporary transit facility – Camp Hurriya (formerly called Camp Liberty) adjacent to the Baghdad International Airport – to which to relocate under guarantees of security. The MOU also provided for regular, in-person human rights monitoring by the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), headed by the able and energetic Ambassador Martin Kobler, and the ability to participate in a Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process to be undertaken by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Additionally, through the MOU, the Iraqi Government made a commitment to the principle of non-refoulement. These were important steps forward by the Iraqi government.

Following conclusion of the MOU, the Iraqi Government worked with the UN and the residents of Camp Ashraf to begin the moves to Camp Hurriya. The first convoy to Hurriya occurred February 18, with nearly 400 people. Despite some complications and delays, it took place peacefully and was observed by U.S. officials from Embassy Baghdad in addition to UN monitors. A second and similar convoy of nearly 400 residents occurred on March 8, followed by a third convoy on March 19, a fourth on April 16, and the fifth and most recent convoy on May 5. Together, nearly 2000 residents of Ashraf have moved to Camp Hurriya, which is well over half the total.

After the fifth convoy, the Department of State publicly welcomed the progress to date, including the continued cooperation of the Iraqi Government and the residents of Camp Ashraf with UNAMI in implementation of the MOU. Our statement also noted the need to increase our focus on our ultimate objective: the safe relocation of the residents from Camp Hurriya out of Iraq, and we joined the UN’s call to member states to assist in this effort.

The process of relocating residents to Hurriya has had challenges. Each convoy, carrying approximately 400 Ashraf residents, their personal effects, and large quantities of cargo to Hurriya, has been a significant logistical undertaking. The Iraqi government has provided dozens of coach busses and cargo trucks and literally thousands of Iraqi security forces to provide for the convoy’s security on the road. Accompanying each convoy are UN human rights monitors, who also observe the screening of residents and property as each convoy loads from Camp Ashraf and provide useful, neutral reports following each convoy movement. The preparation of each convoy is lengthy and disagreements, sometimes heated, have occurred between the Iraqi authorities and the residents about cargo, screening procedures and other issues. The U.S. Embassy and Department of State of followed the progress of each convoy closely, often in real time, in support of the UN; we are well aware of the difficulties involved. Given the history of Camp Ashraf, the emotions involved, and the fact that many of those at Camp Ashraf have resided there for years, this should not surprise us. Indeed, the fact of continued progress is more remarkable than the difficulties. Patience and compromise have been required, and will still be required, as the last convoys needed to close Camp Ashraf are organized.

Living conditions at Camp Hurriya have also had their challenges. Camp Hurriya, when under U.S. control, was part of the largest coalition base in Iraq, housing thousands of American and coalition forces during military operations in Iraq. The containerized housing units (CHUs), which the former Ashraf residents now occupy, previously housed our service personnel. Hurriya also includes among its living spaces a large dining facility, fitness facility, a mosque, and recreational space for the residents. The UN studied the infrastructure before the first convoy and judged that the facility met or exceeded international humanitarian standards for such encampments to support the relocation of all Ashraf residents.

Nevertheless, some legitimate concerns were raised about conditions at Hurriya. There were early issues with water, sewage and electric power, though many of these have been resolved. There were early concerns about the location and size of Iraqi police units at Camp Hurriya, though here, too, a satisfactory resolution was worked out. Both Camps Ashraf and Hurriya have internet connectivity to the world.

Still, some issues remain. For example, greater attention needs to be paid to the repair of air conditioning units by the Government of Iraq, and other basic welfare needs, such as accommodations for the disabled, ought to be addressed. With the onset of hot weather, requirements of electric power and water deliveries will increase, and the number of needed utility vehicles for provision of water and removal of sewage therefore will grow. The Iraqi government needs to work with the UN to address ongoing humanitarian concerns as the population at Camp Hurriya grows amid hot weather. The residents meanwhile need to engage with the Iraqi government, the UN, and others on these serious issues in a focused manner.

The UNAMI monitors, who visit Hurriya daily, and U.S. Embassy officers, who also visit frequently, have been invaluable in working out problems and keeping us informed about the details of issues that develop. UNAMI, with active U.S. support, is working at high-levels with the Iraqi government to ensure the welfare of the residents is not compromised and to resolve issues that arise. Continued efforts will be needed, especially now that the hot season has arrived.

It is important that the final convoys from Ashraf take place and that Camp Ashraf be closed. Our efforts do not end, however, with Camp Ashraf’s closure. Indeed, we must not lose sight of our purpose: the relocation of Camp Ashraf residents out of Iraq. The way for residents out of Iraq lies through the UNHCR process. With start-up issues largely resolved, the UNHCR has intensified its efforts and increased its resources to interview and review residents for refugee status eligibility, the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process.

The next great task in this effort requires continued participation of the residents in the UNHCR process, and the diplomatic work of relocating those residents out of Iraq. For our part, the United States has informed the UNHCR and our international partners that we will receive UNHCR’s referrals of some individuals.

These referrals will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, consistent with applicable U.S. law. Other governments have stated their intention to take similar actions, and some have begun the process of reviewing residents.

Let me be clear: it will be critical for the United States to demonstrate leadership in this area. Our doing so will be essential to finding a solution. We hope to have the support of the Congress and all who in the past have expressed concern for the welfare of the residents of Camp Ashraf. We will also need the continued cooperation of the remaining Ashraf residents to move swiftly to relocate to Hurriya, and the cooperation of the residents of Camp Hurriya with the UNHCR.

The next stage of the process will be challenging. Some in Camp Hurriya may choose to return voluntarily to Iran. Others may find that they have credentials and connections to European or other nations and can resettle there. Still others will require resettlement as refugees or other permission to reside in third countries through the UNHCR’s good offices. Some of our European partners have already indicated that they will interview residents to determine eligibility for resettlement within their respective countries. In all these cases, the United States will encourage prompt and secure relocation of the residents of Hurriya and, again, we must be prepared to do our part, hopefully with support of Congress.

I want to commend the extraordinary work being done by the UNAMI and UNHCR missions in Iraq, and the intense engagement of U.S. Ambassador Jeffrey and his dedicated team. Their diligence, creativity, and commitment have been essential to the progress made thus far. They routinely mediate disputes – from the mundane to the more serious – and without their leadership at all levels this process would be immensely more difficult, and human lives would be in greater jeopardy.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, this is in the nature of an interim report. Much has been achieved since last December’s hearing. Much remains to be done. This is a complex and dynamic issue, and it consumes an enormous amount of resources, for UNAMI, for UNHCR, and for the UN writ large; and the U.S. is devoting attention commensurate with the need.

Our paramount interest in this situation is humanitarian. We have much still to do, and the potential for serious trouble remains. The difficult history of the MEK in Iraq is a matter of record. But at last we are on a road to resolve this problem through the relocation of Ashraf residents out of Iraq.
Thank you for this opportunity and I welcome your questions.

U.S. VIEW ON ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION

The following excerpt is from the U.S. Department of State website:

Susan E. Rice
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations 

New York, NY

February 17, 2012

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Today, Americans join with Libyans around the world in marking the one-year anniversary of their historic revolution. When Muammar Qadhafi chose to meet peaceful cries for liberty with military force, the Libyan people courageously fought back, and the world was inspired. That Benghazi and, indeed, all of Libya, are no longer menaced by a tyrant is a credit to the profound sacrifices of the Libyan people.

There are still significant challenges ahead for Libya. The work of building a strong, open society is arduous, including reintegrating militias into civilian life, securing weapons stockpiles, resettling thousands of refugees and displaced persons, and protecting the human rights of all people in Libya.

As Libya tackles these challenges, the United States, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, and our other international partners stand ready to help. As they create a new society, the Libyan people have a strong partner in the United States of America, who will not soon forget the hope that began on February 17 or the innumerable sacrifices that followed.